A model of technology transfer under taxation by Michelacakis, Nickolas
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
A model of technology transfer under
taxation
Nickolas Michelacakis
September 2014
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/58632/
MPRA Paper No. 58632, posted 22. September 2014 14:02 UTC
A model of tehnology transfer under taxation
N.J. Mihelaakis

University of Piraeus, Eonomis Department, 80 Karaoli & Dimitriou Strs., 18534, Greee
September 14, 2014
Abstrat
In this paper, we onstrut a model to study the tehnology transfer deision
of a monopolist, with aess to a nite number of tehnologies, under taxation.
It is shown that a poliy maker in a low-wage developing ountry annot al-
ways inrease the number of tehnologies transferred from a developed ountry
through a tax on wages-and-invest sheme. We provide onditions for suh an
intervention to be suessful and show that there is no unique hoie of tax for
doing so.
Keywords: te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1 Introdution
In reent years international tehnology transfer has been a prominent topi in the
literature on international trade and eonomi development. It is widely reognised
that tehnology is traditionally reated in developed ountries only to be gradually
transferred to less developed ountries as it beomes obsolete. These onsiderations
lead to the \produt yles" introdued by Vernon, [Vernon 1966℄, and further studied
by Krugman, [Krugman 1979℄.
Dynami models of tehnology diusion, see for example [Findlay 1978℄, have
also been used to explain the transfer of tehnology from a developed ountry (DC)
to a less developed ountry (LDC) and to understand the role played by foreign diret
investment in fostering these transfers. Related to this is the quest for the \right"
poliy measures to enourage multinational orporations to transfer more tehnol-
ogy to aÆliates in less developed ountries inreasing the potential for spillovers. A

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omplementary line of researh has foused on how government taxation of royalties
paid by the aÆliates to parent ompanies inuenes loal R&D and the transfer of
tehnology, [Hines 1995℄.
In this paper, we attempt to address the question of whether a tax on wages-and-
invest sheme an aet the proess of tehnology transfer from the so alled developed
North to the developing South. We onstrut a simple partial equilibriummodel where
a monopolist, namely a multinational rm, has aess to a nite number of dierent
tehnologies for produing a spei good. A simpler form of the model, has appeared
in [Marjit 1988℄. It is initially shown that the implementation of suh a sheme in
a losed eonomy aets the magnitude, not the order, of the osts assoiated with
eah tehnology employed in the prodution of the good. In partiular, the appliation
of a tax on wages-and-invest sheme splits the tehnologies into two groups, one of
whih may perfetly be empty. The rst group is omposed of those tehnologies
that draw benet from the applied sheme beoming more eÆient while the seond
is omposed of those tehnologies that, following a state intervention, are left worse
o, i.e. with prodution osts revised upwards, Theorem 2.5. Further analysis of
our model adjusted for the ase of the DC-LDC bipolar yields results that aept a
dual interpretation. Read from the point of view of the developing South, they may
spell out a poliy to promote the tehnology transfer from the North. Read from the
point of view of the developed North, they may ditate a protetionist poliy against
tehnology transfers. The alloation of tehnologies aross the world is motivated
by prot maximization and it is shown that the less advaned tehnologies are more
likely to get transferred rst. It is also shown that often a tax on wages-and-invest
poliy annot by itself tilt the alloation of tehnologies aross the world. Conditions
are given on when this may happen, Theorem 2.11.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. In Setion 2 we introdue
the model and derive all the results. In Setion 3, we explain further the results of
Setion 2 through a omparative statis disussion. In Setion 4, we onlude.
2 The model
A monopolist in a developed ountry (DC) has aess to n dierent tehnologies
ordered by their eÆieny oeÆient a
i
as follows
0 < a
1
< a
2
<    < a
n
:
The labour requirement a
i
(x) to produe x units of the produt using i tehnology is
therefore proportional to a
i
while the respetive ost of prodution C
i
(x) is given by
C
i
(x) = Wa
i
(x)x = Wa
i
x
2
with a
i
(x) = a
i
x ; i 2 f1; : : : ; ng ;
whereW > 0 is the wage rate of DC, assumed uniform for all tehnologies i. It follows
immediately from our assumptions that
a
1
(x) < a
2
(x) <    < a
n
(x)
2
and
C
1
(x) < C
2
(x) <    < C
n
(x) :
Let us, now, introdue a uniform tax T levied exlusively on the wage rate
W to be used by the state as a publi poliy instrument via an investment funtion
f : R
+
! [0; a
1
), again uniform for all tehnologies. It is understood that this funtion
is an inherent harateristi of the administration of DC. Following the introdution
of the tax T and the implementation of the return benet f(T ), the rank of the
tehnologies remain unhanged
0 < a
1
  f(T ) < a
2
  f(T ) <    < a
n
  f(T ) ;
while the new prodution ost is set to
C(T; f)
i
(x) = (W + T ) (a
i
  f(T ))x
2
= Wa
i
x
2
+ (Ta
i
 Wf(T )  Tf(T ))x
2
; 8i :
A tehnology, i, benets from the introdution of the levy T and the subsequent state
intervention if and only if
C(T; f)
i
(x) < C
i
(x) ;
i.e. if and only if
Wa
i
x
2
+ (Ta
i
 Wf(T )  Tf(T ))x
2
< Wa
i
x
2
,
Ta
i
 Wf(T )  Tf(T ) < 0 :(2.0.0)
Let us all the implementation of the levy T on the wage rate along with a uniform
benet on the labour requirement f(T ) a (T; f) state intervention. Rearranging (2.0.0)
and taking into aount the denition of f , we get
Lemma 2.1 In a losed eonomy, the tehnologies, i, that benet from a (T; f) state
intervention are preisely those for whih
Ta
i
W + T
< f(T ) < a
1
:(2.1.0)
Given a state intervention (T; f), the monopolist's prot funtion is given by
P (T; f)(x
1
; : : : ; x
n
) = p(x
1
+   + x
n
) 
n
X
i=1
C(T; f)
i
(x
i
) ;
where p is the prie of the produt. One dedues that in the extrapolated ase of
a single tehnology, a
i
= a for all i, the introdution of a small tax T of order
0 < T <
W
=
a 1
inreases the prot of the monopolist provided f is suh that
Ta
=
W+T
<
f(T ) < a. Generally,
3
Proposition 2.2 In a losed eonomy with n  2, for
0 < T <
W
a
n
a
1
  1
and
Ta
n
W + T
< f(T ) < a
1
;
a (T,f) state intervention lowers the prodution ost of all tehnologies inreasing the
prot of the monopolist.
PROOF. The rst double inequality is neessary for the seond to be true beause
T <
W
a
n
a
1
  1
=
Wa
1
a
n
  a
1
, Ta
n
  Ta
1
< Wa
1
,
Ta
n
T +W
< a
1
:
Notie that
a
1
< a
2
<    < a
n
,
Ta
1
T +W
<
Ta
2
T +W
<    <
Ta
n
T +W
;
therefore
Ta
n
W + T
< f(T ) )
Ta
i
W + T
< f(T ) , Ta
i
 Wf(T )  Tf(T ) < 0
for all i and the result follows from (2.0.0).
Remark 2.3 We observe that the result in Proposition 2.2 was proved under no as-
sumptions on f other than it be a funtion.
From now on, we require that the investment funtion f be twie dierentiable on
[0;1), stritly inreasing, stritly onave, i.e. f
00
< 0, and suh that f(0) = 0.
Denition 2.4 We dene i
f
2 f0; 1; : : : ; ng to be the biggest index suh that a
i
f

f
0
(0)W . We let i
f
 0 if and only if f
0
(0)W < a
i
for all i 2 f1; : : : ; ng.
Theorem 2.5 Let i
f
be as in Denition 2.4 with i
f
6= 0. Then, there is a T
i
f
> 0,
suh that for all T 2 (0;T
i
f
) the implementation of a (T; f) state intervention lowers
the prodution ost for all tehnologies i, with 1  i  i
f
.
Conversely, if there is a T > 0, suh that for all T 2 (0;T ) the implementation
of a (T; f) state intervention lowers the prodution ost of all tehnologies i, with
1  i  i
f
then, a
i
< f
0
(0)W; 1  i < i
f
.
PROOF. Applying De l'Ho^pital's theorem, we get
lim
T!0
+
f(T )
Ta
i
f
W+T
= lim
T!0
+
f
0
(T )
a
i
f
(W+T ) Ta
i
f
(W+T )
2
= lim
T!0
+
f
0
(T )
Wa
i
f
(W + T )
2
=
f
0
(0)
a
i
f
W > 1 :
4
This means that there is an open interval, (0;T
i
f
), suh that
f(T )
Ta
i
f
W+T
> 1 ,
Ta
i
f
W + T
< f(T ) ;8T 2 (0;T
i
f
) :
Lemma 2.1 ompletes the proof.
To prove the onverse, the fat that a state intervention (T; f) lowers the unit pro-
dution ost of tehnology i
f
means that
Wa
i
f
> (W + T )(a
i
f
  f(T )) , (W + T )f(T ) > Ta
i
f
,
f(T )
Ta
i
f
T+W
> 1; 8T 2 (0;T ) :
Therefore,
f
0
(0)
a
i
f
W = lim
T!0
+
f
0
(T )
a
i
f
(W+T ) Ta
i
f
(W+T )
2
= lim
T!0
+
f(T )
Ta
i
f
W+T
 1 :
To omplete the proof we observe that
a
i
< a
i
f
 f
0
(0)W ; 81  i < i
f
:
Proposition 2.6 Let i
f
be as in Denition 2.4 with i
f
6= 0. Then, there is an open
interval (0;T ), suh that for all i; 1  i < i
f
, the benet
b
i
(T ) :=Wa
i
  (W + T )(a
i
  f(T )) = Wf(T )  Ta
i
+ Tf(T )
obtained by a state intervention (T; f) is an inreasing funtion of the levy T 2 (0;T ).
Similarly, the inrease of the prodution ost for all i
f
< i  n is again an inreasing
funtion of the levy T 2 (0;T ) for the same T .
PROOF. Let 1  i  i
f
. Taking the derivative of b
i
(T ), we observe that
b
0
i
(T ) = Wf
0
(T )  a
i
+ f(T ) + Tf
0
(T ) > 0
provided
Wf
0
(T )  a
i
> 0
whih holds true in (0;T
i
), for some T
i
> 0, sine f
0
is ontinuous by assumption and
a
i
< Wf
0
(0). For eah i > i
f
the result follows by a similar to the above argument
together with the fat that from the denition of i
f
Wf
0
(T )  a
i
< 0 ;8i > i
f
:
To omplete the proof, we take T = minfT
i
g
1in
.
Up until this point we have been disussing the situation of a losed eonomy. We,
now, assume that the monopolist an transfer part of his prodution abroad, usually
to a less developed ountry (LDC) so that he an prot from the lower wage rate that
5
omes along. In onsisteny with [Marjit 1988℄, we denote all indees haraterizing
the eonomy of the LDC by an upper left star (*). Thus, in general, we expet
the wage rate W

< W while we assume the orresponding labour requirement, a

i
,
uniformly inreased throughout the tehnology spetrum, i.e. a

i
= a
i
+ t; t > 0. We,
further, look at the natural question a poliy maker in the LDC is faed with whether
a state intervention (T

; f

) ould prove helpful in promoting a tehnology transfer
from the DC to the LDC. The LDC investment funtion f

: [0;1)! [0; t) is again
twie dierentiable, stritly inreasing, stritly onave, i.e.(f

)
00
< 0, and f

(0) = 0.
Proposition 2.7 The i-th tehnology will be transferred following a state intervention
(T

; f

) with T

> 0, if and only if
D
i
(T

) := f

(T

) 
T

(a
i
+ t)
W

+ T

>
W

(a
i
+ t) Wa
i
W

+ T

=: Q
i
(T

) :(2.7.0)
PROOF. By the hypothesis of the theorem we get
D
i
(T

) := f

(T

) 
T

(a
i
+ t)
W

+ T

>
W

(a
i
+ t) Wa
i
W

+ T

:
Equivalently
f

(T

) >
W

(a
i
+ t) Wa
i
W

+ T

+
T

(a
i
+ t)
W

+ T

;
i.e.,
f

(T

)(W

+ T

) > W

(a
i
+ t) Wa
i
+ T

(a
i
+ t)
f

(T

)(W

+ T

) > (W

+ T

)(a
i
+ t) Wa
i
Wa
i
> (W

+ T

)(a
i
+ t)  f

(T

)(W

+ T

)
Wa
i
> (W

+ T

)(a
i
+ t  f

(T

)) ;
whih ompletes the proof.
Lemma 2.8 If the i-th tehnology is transferred under a (T

; f

) state intervention
then so do all less eÆient tehnologies.
PROOF. The fat that the i-th tehnology is transfered is equivalent to
Wa
i
> (W

+ T

)(a
i
+ t  f

(T

)) ,
W
W

+ T

>
a
i
+ t  f

(T

)
a
i
:
By assumption f

(T

) < t, so for j > i,
(a
j
  a
i
)(t  f

(T

)) > 0 ,
a
i
+ t  f

(T

)
a
i
>
a
j
+ t  f

(T

)
a
j
6
thus,
W
W

+ T

>
a
i
+ t  f

(T

)
a
i
>
a
j
+ t  f

(T

)
a
j
) Wa
j
> (W

+T

)(a
j
+t f

(T

))
and the j-th tehnology is transferred as well.
Denition 2.9 Let s 2 f0; 1; : : : ; ng denote the smallest index suh that
W
W

>
a
s
+ t
a
s
:
We set s  n + 1 if and only if s =2 f1; : : : ; ng.
Corollary 2.10 (Marjit 1988) Let s be as in Denition 2.9. Without state inter-
vention, all tehnologies i with s  i  n will be transferred abroad.
PROOF. If there is no state intervention, i.e. if T

= 0, then, D
i
(T

) = 0 for all i, in
partiular, D
s
(T

) = 0 and
W
W

>
a
s
+ t
a
s
, D
s
(T

) = 0 >
W

(a
s
+ t) Wa
s
W

:
The result follows from a ombination of Proposition 2.7 and Lemma 2.8.
Let i
f

as in Denition 2.4 for the LDC and s as in Denition 2.9. Dene
R
i
(T

) := D
i
(T

) Q
i
(T

) ; i 2 f1; : : : ; ng :
Beause of Theorem 2.5, applied on the LDC, there is a T

> 0 so that D
i
(T

) > 0 for
all T

2 (0;T

) and all i 2 f1; : : : ; i
f

g. The ontinuity of R
i
: (0;T

) ! R implies
that R
 1
i
[(0;1)℄ is an open subinterval of (0;T

). Dene r 2 f0; 1; : : : ; ng by
(0;T

) \R
 1
r
[(0;1)℄ 6= ; while (0;T

) \ R
 1
i
[(0;1)℄ = ; i 2 f1; : : : ; r   1g :
If i
f

= 0, or if R
i
takes non-positive values for all i 2 f1; : : : ; ng then, we dene
r  n + 1.
Theorem 2.11 Given f

let s; i
f

and r be dened as above.
(i) If i
f

+ 1 < s then, no tax an inrease the number of tehnologies to be trans-
ferred.
(ii) If s < i
f

+1 then, r  s and there is an open subinterval U  (0;T

) suh that
the implementation of any intervention (T

; f

); T

2 U results in the transfer
of all tehnologies with i  r.
(iii) If s = i
f

+ 1 then, either there exists r < s and (ii) holds true or else (i) holds
true.
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PROOF. For the rst part of the theorem, notie that by the denition of i
f

and
Theorem 2.5 applied on the LDC we get D
s 1
(T

) < 0 for all T

> 0. On the other
hand, the denition of s ensures that W

(a
s 1
+ t) Wa
s 1
> 0 rendering impossible
inequality (2.7.0) and therefore, by Proposition 2.7, the (s   1)-tehnology does not
get transferred, nor does any more eÆient tehnology beause of Lemma 2.8.
To prove (ii), notie that for s  i < i
f

+ 1 there is a T

> 0 so that D
i
(T

) > 0 >
Q
i
(T

), i.e. R
i
(T

) > 0 and therefore r  s. We may take U = (0;T

) \R
 1
r
[(0;1)℄
and the result follows from the denition of r, the ontinuity of R
r
, Proposition 2.7
and Lemma 2.8.
For the third part of the theorem, if r  s the proof follows the lines of part (ii).
Otherwise, Corollary 2.10 applies ompleting the proof.
Corollary 2.12 Let s  i
f

+ 1. If there is k < s suh that
D
i
f

(T

) >
W

(a
k
+ t) Wa
k
W

:(2.12.0)
for some T

, all less eÆient tehnologies, inluding k, get transferred.
PROOF. Inequality (2.12.0) implies
D
i
f

(T

) = f

(T

) 
T

(a
i
f

+ t)
W

+ T

>
W

(a
k
+ t) Wa
k
W

>
W

(a
k
+ t) Wa
k
W

+ T

whih together with k  i
f

implies that
f

(T

) >
W

(a
k
+ t) Wa
k
W

+ T

+
T

(a
i
f

+ t)
W

+ T


W

(a
k
+ t) Wa
k
W

+ T

+
T

(a
k
+ t)
W

+ T

:
and the result follows from Proposition 2.7 and Lemma 2.8.
3 Disussion
In this setion, we shall analyse further the results in Setion 2 in order to reveal the
eonomi meaning hidden under the mathematial guise of Proposition 2.2, Theorem
2.5, Proposition 2.6 and Theorem 2.11.
First, we make some omments on the publi investment funtion f : R
+
!
[0; a
1
). It is natural to assume that without taxation there is nothing the state an
invest, i.e. f(0) = 0. Moreover, f has to be an inreasing funtion, albeit at a
dereasing rate, in a fashion similar to a utility funtion. The assumption on the
range of f is a diret outome of the fat that whatever gain a state intervention
an oer to the prodution of a produt this annot exeed the labour requirement
of the most eÆient tehnology. It implies though that the asymptoti behaviour of
f as well as its urvature, in fat f itself is produt-spei. This is, however, not a
surprise as the impat of state intervention is not the same for all produts.
8
Proposition 2.2 says that, under onditions, in a losed eonomy, a monopolist
may atually inrease his prot through a publi investment sheme. The tehnolo-
gies beneted from the implementation of suh a sheme are those that are more
eÆient. Aording to Lemma 2.1, for a spei produt, if all parameters of the
eonomy inluding the state intervention (T; f) are kept xed benet will result for
those tehnologies for whih the labour requirement is suÆiently small so that (2.1.0)
holds true. On the other hand, given the eÆieny oeÆients a
i
's of the dierent
tehnologies, the lower the monopolist's ontribution as a perentage of total wage is
the greater the number of tehnologies beneted by a xed state intervention (T; f).
This happens more frequently in developed ountries as it is traditionally these oun-
tries that exhibit higher wage rates. Theorem 2.5 provides a neessary and suÆient
ondition for suh taxes to exist in a onvex neighbourhood of 0. The tehnologies
beneted do not depend on the magnitude of the tax T . They only depend on the
order relation of the wage rate and the marginal publi investment at 0, i.e. on the
wage rate and the geometry of f at 0. However, if a state intervention has resulted
in benet for a spei tehnology, the atual benet is an inreasing funtion of
T 2 (0;T ), for some T > 0 ommon for all beneted tehnologies, Proposition 2.6.
Theorem 2.11 an have both a forward and a bakward reading. As it stands,
it provides a suÆient ondition for a tehnology to be transferred under a state
intervention (T

; f

). Without a state intervention the tehnologies are split into two
groups aording to the sign of the diereneW

(a
i
+ t) Wa
i
, Corollary 2.10. If the
harateristis of the eonomy in the LDC are suh that a publi investment sheme
an improve the prodution ost of the rst i
f

tehnologies with i
f

< s  1 then, no
state intervention an alter the balane of the tehnologies transferred. If, however,
s  1  i
f

then, publi investment ould be beneial for the less developed ountry
in the sense that it ould inrease the number of tehnologies transferred from a DC.
Corollary 2.12 oers a suÆient target for a poliy maker should he wish to intervene
sine the right-hand side of inequality (2.12.0) is independent of T

.
4 Conluding remarks
In this paper, we have onstruted a rather simple model to address the prodution
deision of a monopolist under taxation. We have knowingly put aside a number of
fators suh as asymmetry of demand between north and south, transfer osts et. to
better fous on the main question whih is whether and how a state intervention by
means of taxation an aet the deision proess of a multinational.
Theorem 2.5 measures the eetiveness of a state intervention through a tax on
wages on the prodution of a spei good. The main Theorem 2.11 says that suh
an intervention is in many ases fruitless, Theorem 2.11 (i), lending support to those
who fervently oppose all taxes. Theorem 2.11 (ii) provides onditions for a suessful
intervention to exist. It, further, says that if a single tax value an tilt the equilibrium
then so do all values of T

in a bounded, open interval of R
+
.
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